斯蒂格利茨：1%的人所有、1%的人治理、1%的人享用
對(duì)已經(jīng)發(fā)生的事視而不見(jiàn)，那是沒(méi)有用的?，F(xiàn)在，身居美國(guó)財(cái)富金字塔頂端的1%人口每年收入占全國(guó)總收入將近四分之一。若以所擁有的財(cái)富而論，這1%人口所控制比例達(dá)40%。而在25年前，這兩個(gè)數(shù)字分別為12%和33%。對(duì)此有人表示，是獨(dú)創(chuàng)性和干勁給這些人帶來(lái)了財(cái)富，并主張說(shuō)二十多年來(lái)所有人的生活都已水漲船高。
這種觀點(diǎn)是具有誤導(dǎo)性的。過(guò)去10年來(lái)，上層1%人群的收入激增18%，中產(chǎn)階層的收入?yún)s在下降。而對(duì)于只有高中文化程度的人來(lái)說(shuō)，收入的下降尤其明顯--光是在過(guò)去25年里，就下降了12%。最近幾十年來(lái)所有的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)，還有其他好處，都流向了金字塔頂端的人群。在收入平等方面，美國(guó)落后于小布什曾經(jīng)嘲笑過(guò)的"老舊"、"僵化"的歐洲國(guó)家，這方面可與美國(guó)比肩的是存在寡頭政治的俄羅斯，還有伊朗。拉丁美洲許多過(guò)去以收入不平等著稱的國(guó)家--如巴西--最近幾年都急速發(fā)展，成功地改善了窮人的困境，縮小了收入差距，而美國(guó)卻讓不平等狀況加劇。很久以前，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家就試圖證明巨大的收入不平等是正當(dāng)?shù)摹?9世紀(jì)中期，美國(guó)深為這種情況困擾時(shí)(雖然與現(xiàn)在相比，那時(shí)的差距只是小菜一碟)，他們就提出了"邊際生產(chǎn)力理論"，將高收入者與更高的生產(chǎn)力、對(duì)社會(huì)有更大貢獻(xiàn)聯(lián)系在一起。富人一直深?lèi)?ài)這種理論。
然而，沒(méi)有多少證據(jù)表明這種理論站得住腳。過(guò)去三年來(lái)，造成經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)的那些公司高管對(duì)社會(huì)及自己公司的貢獻(xiàn)主要是負(fù)面的，然而他們至今仍領(lǐng)取著大筆"績(jī)效獎(jiǎng)金"。有時(shí)連他們所屬的公司也覺(jué)得"績(jī)效獎(jiǎng)金"之名令人尷尬，改稱"留才紅利"，雖然它們唯一留住的是這些人糟糕的業(yè)績(jī)。與這些把全球經(jīng)濟(jì)拖到毀滅邊緣的人相比，那些給社會(huì)真正做出貢獻(xiàn)的人--包括遺傳研究先鋒和信息時(shí)代領(lǐng)航者--所獲取的報(bào)酬簡(jiǎn)直是微不足道。
對(duì)于這種狀況，一些人聳聳肩，一笑了之。這個(gè)人賺了，那個(gè)人虧了，那又怎么樣呢？他們說(shuō)，現(xiàn)在重要的不是如何分配蛋糕，而是蛋糕的尺寸有多大。這種觀點(diǎn)從根本上就是錯(cuò)誤的。一個(gè)大部分市民年復(fù)一年境況越來(lái)越糟糕的經(jīng)濟(jì)體--亦即美國(guó)這樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)體--長(zhǎng)期來(lái)說(shuō)也不可能表現(xiàn)得很好。理由如下：
首先，日益擴(kuò)大的收入不平等其實(shí)是另外一件事的外部表現(xiàn)，那就是機(jī)遇的減少。無(wú)論何時(shí)，只要機(jī)遇的平等在減少，這就意味著我們未能以最有效方式使用最有價(jià)值的資產(chǎn)--人；其次，很多導(dǎo)致收入不平等的不當(dāng)做法--比如鼓勵(lì)壟斷、偏向特殊利益集體的稅收政策--都會(huì)降低經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。而新的不平等還導(dǎo)致新的錯(cuò)誤，使經(jīng)濟(jì)效益進(jìn)一步降低。僅舉一例：許多才華橫溢的年輕人受豐厚收入吸引進(jìn)入金融行業(yè)，而不是進(jìn)入更符合他們興趣、更有利于發(fā)揮他們的才華、更能塑造健康經(jīng)濟(jì)的領(lǐng)域工作；第三點(diǎn)，可能也是最重要的一點(diǎn)，就是現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)要求"集體行動(dòng)"--它需要政府投資于基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、教育和技術(shù)。政府資助的研究引領(lǐng)了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)時(shí)代的到來(lái)，促進(jìn)了公共健康等領(lǐng)域的飛速發(fā)展，美國(guó)和世界各國(guó)都從中受益匪淺。但長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，美國(guó)便飽受基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、基礎(chǔ)研究、各級(jí)教育投資不足之苦(看看我們的高速公路、橋梁、鐵路和機(jī)場(chǎng)吧)，接下來(lái)這些領(lǐng)域的預(yù)算還要被大幅削減。
這些現(xiàn)象的發(fā)生絲毫不足為奇--當(dāng)一個(gè)社會(huì)的財(cái)富分配極為不平衡時(shí)，這一切就會(huì)自然而然地出現(xiàn)。一個(gè)社會(huì)在財(cái)富分配方面差距越大，用于公共需要的財(cái)富數(shù)量就會(huì)越少。富人無(wú)須依靠政府建的公園，政府辦的教育、醫(yī)療和個(gè)人安保機(jī)構(gòu)，他們可以用錢(qián)買(mǎi)到這一切。在此過(guò)程中，他們離普通人越來(lái)越遠(yuǎn)，對(duì)于普通人曾有的同情也隨之淡化。他們也不喜歡大政府--因?yàn)榇笳梢岳米约旱牧α縼?lái)調(diào)整這種不平衡，拿走他們部分財(cái)富，以投資于公共需求。他們可能會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)現(xiàn)有政府頗有怨言，但事實(shí)上他們還是挺喜歡它的：囿于條條框框無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)再分配，各部門(mén)意見(jiàn)分歧，除了減稅，什么事也做不成。
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家不知如何充分解釋美國(guó)出現(xiàn)的收入日益不平等現(xiàn)象。普通的供需原理肯定在其中扮演了一定角色：可以節(jié)省勞力的技術(shù)令很多藍(lán)領(lǐng)、中產(chǎn)勞動(dòng)者失去工作機(jī)會(huì)，全球化浪潮則創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)世界性的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)，迫使昂貴的美國(guó)非熟練工與廉價(jià)的海外非熟練工競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。社會(huì)變化也起到一定作用--比如說(shuō)工會(huì)的衰退，過(guò)去美國(guó)三分之一的工人加入工會(huì)，現(xiàn)在只有大約12%。
但是，之所以出現(xiàn)這樣大的收入不平等，一個(gè)主要原因是：金字塔頂端的1%人群希望事情變成這樣。最明顯的例證就是稅收政策。
富人們很大一部分財(cái)富來(lái)自資本收益，而降低資本收益稅率讓最富有的美國(guó)人幾乎可以坐享其成。壟斷和類(lèi)壟斷經(jīng)營(yíng)一直是大亨們的收入來(lái)源之一，從20世紀(jì)初的洛克菲勒到20世紀(jì)末的比爾?蓋茨，莫不如此。而反托拉斯法規(guī)執(zhí)行不力(特別是在共和黨執(zhí)政時(shí)期)，對(duì)金字塔頂端人群來(lái)說(shuō)是天賜之福。今日之收入不平等還有很大一部分來(lái)自金融系統(tǒng)的操縱，輔以監(jiān)管規(guī)則的變化(均由金融業(yè)出資推動(dòng)，這是他們最好的投資之一)。政府以近乎為零的利率，將錢(qián)借給金融機(jī)構(gòu)，當(dāng)他們失敗時(shí)又提供慷慨的救市資金，條款極為優(yōu)厚。對(duì)于該行業(yè)的不透明和利益沖突，監(jiān)管者則視而不見(jiàn)。
細(xì)看美國(guó)上層1%人群所控制的財(cái)富規(guī)模，簡(jiǎn)直可以說(shuō)擴(kuò)大收入差距乃現(xiàn)代美國(guó)一大成就--當(dāng)初我們?cè)谶@方面遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后，可是現(xiàn)在位居世界前列。目前看來(lái)，未來(lái)數(shù)年中，我們還將繼續(xù)鞏固這種"優(yōu)勢(shì)"，因?yàn)樨?cái)富會(huì)帶來(lái)權(quán)力，而權(quán)力則將帶來(lái)更多財(cái)富。在不久前的聯(lián)合公民訴聯(lián)邦選舉委員會(huì)案中，最高法院取消了對(duì)公司使用自有資金影響選舉結(jié)果的限制，為企業(yè)出錢(qián)收買(mǎi)政府大開(kāi)方便之門(mén)。在今日之美國(guó)，富豪與政治完美地結(jié)合在一起。幾乎所有美國(guó)參議員，以及大部分眾議員，以金字塔頂成員身份出任，靠金字塔頂?shù)呢?cái)富支持留任，在任時(shí)會(huì)賣(mài)力為這一人群服務(wù)，以便卸任后得到相應(yīng)犒賞。行政部門(mén)貿(mào)易與經(jīng)濟(jì)政策方面的重要決策者亦基本來(lái)自這一人群。他們通過(guò)立法，禁止最大藥品采購(gòu)方--政府--在采購(gòu)藥品時(shí)議價(jià)，相當(dāng)于給制藥公司奉上價(jià)值萬(wàn)億美元的大禮。除非為富人大幅減稅，否則對(duì)窮人有利的稅法就無(wú)法出臺(tái)，對(duì)此你也不要大跌眼鏡。鑒于塔尖人群所擁有的能量，政府這樣運(yùn)作，我們一點(diǎn)也不該感到驚奇。
收入不平等正扭曲著社會(huì)。大量事實(shí)證明，不少普通大眾效仿塔尖1%人群的生活方式，消費(fèi)超出自身承受能力。先富帶動(dòng)后富的"滴入式經(jīng)濟(jì)"也許只是一種狂想，但塔尖人群的行為方式倒是真的成功滲透到了下面。收入不平等極大地扭曲了我們的外交政策。塔尖1%人群很少去服兵役--志愿兵那點(diǎn)收入根本不能吸引有錢(qián)人的兒女，他們的愛(ài)國(guó)主義僅止于此。國(guó)家參戰(zhàn)時(shí)，他們亦不會(huì)受到高稅額的"勒索"：因?yàn)閲?guó)家全用借來(lái)的錢(qián)支付這些費(fèi)用。外交政策的定義本是平衡國(guó)家利益和國(guó)家資源。但掌權(quán)的1%人群因?yàn)閺牟桓冻鋈魏未鷥r(jià)，所謂平衡和限制的概念有時(shí)和實(shí)際差得很遠(yuǎn)。于是美國(guó)經(jīng)常冒不必要的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，企業(yè)和合同商則跟著逐利。同樣，經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化規(guī)則也是為富人而設(shè)計(jì)的：它們鼓勵(lì)國(guó)家之間的商業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，這會(huì)導(dǎo)致對(duì)企業(yè)降稅，減少健康和環(huán)保方面的投入，破壞過(guò)去被視為核心價(jià)值的勞工權(quán)利。
假如這些規(guī)則鼓勵(lì)國(guó)家之間的勞動(dòng)力競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，結(jié)果將會(huì)怎樣？各國(guó)政府會(huì)爭(zhēng)著保障經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境穩(wěn)定，降低對(duì)普通工薪階層的征稅，提供好的教育和清潔的環(huán)境，這些都是勞動(dòng)者關(guān)心的，塔尖的1%人群才不在乎這些。
或者，更準(zhǔn)確地說(shuō)，他們以為自己不需要關(guān)心這些。塔尖1%人群給社會(huì)帶來(lái)諸多負(fù)面影響，最大后果就是侵蝕了人們對(duì)美國(guó)公民身份感的認(rèn)同，讓普通人不再相信公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、機(jī)會(huì)平等和社區(qū)意識(shí)。美國(guó)向來(lái)以社會(huì)高度公平為傲，宣揚(yáng)人人都有機(jī)會(huì)，但統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)數(shù)據(jù)卻證明了另外一個(gè)事實(shí)：美國(guó)窮人，甚至是中產(chǎn)階級(jí)，擠進(jìn)上流社會(huì)的機(jī)會(huì)遠(yuǎn)比許多歐洲國(guó)家要小?，F(xiàn)實(shí)的牌局對(duì)他們不利。最近中東動(dòng)蕩，正是因?yàn)槿藗儾粷M于體制不公，認(rèn)為沒(méi)有出頭的希望，食品價(jià)格上漲和年輕人失業(yè)率高企只是導(dǎo)火線。眼下美國(guó)年輕人失業(yè)率達(dá)到將近20%(在一些地方和族群中甚至達(dá)到40%)，六分之一的美國(guó)人想得到一份全職工作而不能，七分之一的美國(guó)人要靠食品券生活，大量證據(jù)表明，好處全部留在上層，并未"滴流"到下面，惠及其他人群。這不可避免地導(dǎo)致疏離感--上次大選中，二十多歲人群的參選率約在21%，與失業(yè)率相當(dāng)。
最近數(shù)周，在中東一些國(guó)家，數(shù)百萬(wàn)人涌上街頭，抗議糟糕的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)狀況，一些政權(quán)被推翻。該地區(qū)其他統(tǒng)治家族也正緊張地躲在空調(diào)房里，觀望形勢(shì)--下一個(gè)會(huì)是自己?jiǎn)?？他們的?dān)心是對(duì)的。這些社會(huì)有一些共同點(diǎn)：一小部分人群--不到1%--控制了絕大部分的財(cái)富，而且財(cái)富是權(quán)力的決定性力量，種種腐敗已成痼疾，滲入日常生活，此外富人常常極力阻撓有利民生的政策的實(shí)施。
看著別國(guó)街頭的亂象，我們?cè)搾行淖詥?wèn)：什么時(shí)候會(huì)輪到美國(guó)？在很多重要的方面，美國(guó)正變得跟這些遙遠(yuǎn)的、動(dòng)蕩的國(guó)家一樣。
亞歷西斯
- 德托克維爾在《論美國(guó)的民主》中曾經(jīng)闡述過(guò)他眼中美國(guó)社會(huì)的主要優(yōu)勢(shì)，他稱之為"適度的利己"。重點(diǎn)在于"適度"二字。
每個(gè)人都有狹義上的利己思想，"適度的利己"是不同的。它認(rèn)為關(guān)注別人的利益--換句話說(shuō)，關(guān)注公共福利--是實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人最終利益的先決條件。托克維爾并不認(rèn)為這種想法有多么高貴。事實(shí)恰恰相反，他認(rèn)為這是一種美國(guó)實(shí)用主義的標(biāo)志。精明的美國(guó)人理解一個(gè)基本的事實(shí)：關(guān)心別人不僅對(duì)靈魂有益，對(duì)生意也有好處。
塔尖1%的人群住著最好的房子，享受最好的教育、醫(yī)療和最美妙的生活方式，但是有一樣?xùn)|西錢(qián)是買(mǎi)不來(lái)的：那就是意識(shí)到自己的命運(yùn)取決于其他99%的人生活得如何。縱觀歷史，無(wú)數(shù)1%的人群最終都明白了這一點(diǎn)，但往往為時(shí)已晚。
Inequality
Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%
Americans have been watching protests against oppressive regimes that concentrate massive wealth in the hands of an elite few. Yet in our own democracy, 1 percent of the people take nearly a quarter of the nation’s income—an inequality even the wealthy will come to regret.
By Joseph E. Stiglitz?
Illustration by Stephen Doyle
May 2011
THE FAT AND THE FURIOUS The top 1 percent may have the best houses, educations, and lifestyles, says the author, but “their fate is bound up with how the other 99 percent live.”
It’s no use pretending that what has obviously happened has not in fact happened. The upper 1 percent of Americans are now taking in nearly a quarter of the nation’s income every year. In terms of wealth rather than income, the top 1 percent control 40 percent. Their lot in life has improved considerably. Twenty-five years ago, the corresponding figures were 12 percent and 33 percent. One response might be to celebrate the ingenuity and drive that brought good fortune to these people, and to contend that a rising tide lifts all boats. That response would be misguided. While the top 1 percent have seen their incomes rise 18 percent over the past decade, those in the middle have actually seen their incomes fall. For men with only high-school degrees, the decline has been precipitous—12 percent in the last quarter-century alone. All the growth in recent decades—and more—has gone to those at the top. In terms of income equality, America lags behind any country in the old, ossified Europe that President George W. Bush used to deride. Among our closest counterparts are Russia with its oligarchs and Iran. While many of the old centers of inequality in Latin America, such as Brazil, have been striving in recent years, rather successfully, to improve the plight of the poor and reduce gaps in income, America has allowed inequality to grow.
Economists long ago tried to justify the vast inequalities that seemed so troubling in the mid-19th century—inequalities that are but a pale shadow of what we are seeing in America today. The justification they came up with was called “marginal-productivity theory.” In a nutshell, this theory associated higher incomes with higher productivity and a greater contribution to society. It is a theory that has always been cherished by the rich. Evidence for its validity, however, remains thin. The corporate executives who helped bring on the recession of the past three years—whose contribution to our society, and to their own companies, has been massively negative—went on to receive large bonuses. In some cases, companies were so embarrassed about calling such rewards “performance bonuses” that they felt compelled to change the name to “retention bonuses” (even if the only thing being retained was bad performance). Those who have contributed great positive innovations to our society, from the pioneers of genetic understanding to the pioneers of the Information Age, have received a pittance compared with those responsible for the financial innovations that brought our global economy to the brink of ruin.
Some people look at income inequality and shrug their shoulders. So what if this person gains and that person loses? What matters, they argue, is not how the pie is divided but the size of the pie. That argument is fundamentally wrong. An economy in which most citizens are doing worse year after year—an economy like America’s—is not likely to do well over the long haul. There are several reasons for this.
First, growing inequality is the flip side of something else: shrinking opportunity. Whenever we diminish equality of opportunity, it means that we are not using some of our most valuable assets—our people—in the most productive way possible. Second, many of the distortions that lead to inequality—such as those associated with monopoly power and preferential tax treatment for special interests—undermine the efficiency of the economy. This new inequality goes on to create new distortions, undermining efficiency even further. To give just one example, far too many of our most talented young people, seeing the astronomical rewards, have gone into finance rather than into fields that would lead to a more productive and healthy economy.
Third, and perhaps most important, a modern economy requires “collective action”—it needs government to invest in infrastructure, education, and technology. The United States and the world have benefited greatly from government-sponsored research that led to the Internet, to advances in public health, and so on. But America has long suffered from an under-investment in infrastructure (look at the condition of our highways and bridges, our railroads and airports), in basic research, and in education at all levels. Further cutbacks in these areas lie ahead.
None of this should come as a surprise—it is simply what happens when a society’s wealth distribution becomes lopsided. The more divided a society becomes in terms of wealth, the more reluctant the wealthy become to spend money on common needs. The rich don’t need to rely on government for parks or education or medical care or personal security—they can buy all these things for themselves. In the process, they become more distant from ordinary people, losing whatever empathy they may once have had. They also worry about strong government—one that could use its powers to adjust the balance, take some of their wealth, and invest it for the common good. The top 1 percent may complain about the kind of government we have in America, but in truth they like it just fine: too gridlocked to re-distribute, too divided to do anything but lower taxes.
Economists are not sure how to fully explain the growing inequality in America. The ordinary dynamics of supply and demand have certainly played a role: laborsaving technologies have reduced the demand for many “good” middle-class, blue-collar jobs. Globalization has created a worldwide marketplace, pitting expensive unskilled workers in America against cheap unskilled workers overseas. Social changes have also played a role—for instance, the decline of unions, which once represented a third of American workers and now represent about 12 percent.
But one big part of the reason we have so much inequality is that the top 1 percent want it that way. The most obvious example involves tax policy. Lowering tax rates on capital gains, which is how the rich receive a large portion of their income, has given the wealthiest Americans close to a free ride. Monopolies and near monopolies have always been a source of economic power—from John D. Rockefeller at the beginning of the last century to Bill Gates at the end. Lax enforcement of anti-trust laws, especially during Republican administrations, has been a godsend to the top 1 percent. Much of today’s inequality is due to manipulation of the financial system, enabled by changes in the rules that have been bought and paid for by the financial industry itself—one of its best investments ever. The government lent money to financial institutions at close to 0 percent interest and provided generous bailouts on favorable terms when all else failed. Regulators turned a blind eye to a lack of transparency and to conflicts of interest.
When you look at the sheer volume of wealth controlled by the top 1 percent in this country, it’s tempting to see our growing inequality as a quintessentially American achievement—we started way behind the pack, but now we’re doing inequality on a world-class level. And it looks as if we’ll be building on this achievement for years to come, because what made it possible is self-reinforcing. Wealth begets power, which begets more wealth. During the savings-and-loan scandal of the 1980s—a scandal whose dimensions, by today’s standards, seem almost quaint—the banker Charles Keating was asked by a congressional committee whether the $1.5 million he had spread among a few key elected officials could actually buy influence. “I certainly hope so,” he replied. The Supreme Court, in its recent Citizens United case, has enshrined the right of corporations to buy government, by removing limitations on campaign spending. The personal and the political are today in perfect alignment. Virtually all U.S. senators, and most of the representatives in the House, are members of the top 1 percent when they arrive, are kept in office by money from the top 1 percent, and know that if they serve the top 1 percent well they will be rewarded by the top 1 percent when they leave office. By and large, the key executive-branch policymakers on trade and economic policy also come from the top 1 percent. When pharmaceutical companies receive a trillion-dollar gift—through legislation prohibiting the government, the largest buyer of drugs, from bargaining over price—it should not come as cause for wonder. It should not make jaws drop that a tax bill cannot emerge from Congress unless big tax cuts are put in place for the wealthy. Given the power of the top 1 percent, this is the way you would expect the system to work.
America’s inequality distorts our society in every conceivable way. There is, for one thing, a well-documented lifestyle effect—people outside the top 1 percent increasingly live beyond their means. Trickle-down economics may be a chimera, but trickle-down behaviorism is very real. Inequality massively distorts our foreign policy. The top 1 percent rarely serve in the military—the reality is that the “all-volunteer” army does not pay enough to attract their sons and daughters, and patriotism goes only so far. Plus, the wealthiest class feels no pinch from higher taxes when the nation goes to war: borrowed money will pay for all that. Foreign policy, by definition, is about the balancing of national interests and national resources. With the top 1 percent in charge, and paying no price, the notion of balance and restraint goes out the window. There is no limit to the adventures we can undertake; corporations and contractors stand only to gain. The rules of economic globalization are likewise designed to benefit the rich: they encourage competition among countries for business, which drives down taxes on corporations, weakens health and environmental protections, and undermines what used to be viewed as the “core” labor rights, which include the right to collective bargaining. Imagine what the world might look like if the rules were designed instead to encourage competition among countries for workers. Governments would compete in providing economic security, low taxes on ordinary wage earners, good education, and a clean environment—things workers care about. But the top 1 percent don’t need to care.
Or, more accurately, they think they don’t. Of all the costs imposed on our society by the top 1 percent, perhaps the greatest is this: the erosion of our sense of identity, in which fair play, equality of opportunity, and a sense of community are so important. America has long prided itself on being a fair society, where everyone has an equal chance of getting ahead, but the statistics suggest otherwise: the chances of a poor citizen, or even a middle-class citizen, making it to the top in America are smaller than in many countries of Europe. The cards are stacked against them. It is this sense of an unjust system without opportunity that has given rise to the conflagrations in the Middle East: rising food prices and growing and persistent youth unemployment simply served as kindling. With youth unemployment in America at around 20 percent (and in some locations, and among some socio-demographic groups, at twice that); with one out of six Americans desiring a full-time job not able to get one; with one out of seven Americans on food stamps (and about the same number suffering from “food insecurity”)—given all this, there is ample evidence that something has blocked the vaunted “trickling down” from the top 1 percent to everyone else. All of this is having the predictable effect of creating alienation—voter turnout among those in their 20s in the last election stood at 21 percent, comparable to the unemployment rate.
In recent weeks we have watched people taking to the streets by the millions to protest political, economic, and social conditions in the oppressive societies they inhabit. Governments have been toppled in Egypt and Tunisia. Protests have erupted in Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain. The ruling families elsewhere in the region look on nervously from their air-conditioned penthouses—will they be next? They are right to worry. These are societies where a minuscule fraction of the population—less than 1 percent—controls the lion’s share of the wealth; where wealth is a main determinant of power; where entrenched corruption of one sort or another is a way of life; and where the wealthiest often stand actively in the way of policies that would improve life for people in general.
As we gaze out at the popular fervor in the streets, one question to ask ourselves is this: When will it come to America? In important ways, our own country has become like one of these distant, troubled places.
Alexis de Tocqueville once described what he saw as a chief part of the peculiar genius of American society—something he called “self-interest properly understood.” The last two words were the key. Everyone possesses self-interest in a narrow sense: I want what’s good for me right now! Self-interest “properly understood” is different. It means appreciating that paying attention to everyone else’s self-interest—in other words, the common welfare—is in fact a precondition for one’s own ultimate well-being. Tocqueville was not suggesting that there was anything noble or idealistic about this outlook—in fact, he was suggesting the opposite. It was a mark of American pragmatism. Those canny Americans understood a basic fact: looking out for the other guy isn’t just good for the soul—it’s good for business.
The top 1 percent have the best houses, the best educations, the best doctors, and the best lifestyles, but there is one thing that money doesn’t seem to have bought: an understanding that their fate is bound up with how the other 99 percent live. Throughout history, this is something that the top 1 percent eventually do learn. Too late.
