《資本在21世紀(jì)》系列之一——馬丁·沃爾夫的書(shū)評(píng)
本帖最后由 gangangwen 于 2014-5-17 19:27 編輯 ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’, by Thomas Piketty
評(píng)法國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家托馬斯·皮凱蒂的《資本在21世紀(jì)》An economic, social and political history of the evolution of income and wealth
一部有關(guān)收入和財(cái)富的經(jīng)濟(jì)的、社會(huì)的和政治的演化史Review by Martin Wolf
《金融時(shí)報(bào)》首席財(cái)經(jīng)評(píng)論員 馬丁·沃爾夫Yachts in the marina at Sag Harbor, New YorkCapital in the Twenty-First Century, by Thomas Piketty, translated by Arthur Goldhammer,
Harvard University Press RRP￡29.95/Belknap Press RRP$39.95, 696 pagesFrench economist Thomas Piketty has written an extraordinarily important book. Open-minded readers will surely find themselves unable to ignore the evidence and arguments he has brought to bear.
法國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家托馬斯·皮凱蒂寫出了一部非常重要的著作。開(kāi)明的讀者肯定會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己無(wú)法忽視他在書(shū)中提出的證據(jù)和論點(diǎn)。
Capital in the Twenty-First Century contains four remarkable achievements. First, in its scale and sweep it brings us back to the founders of political economy. Piketty himself sees economics “as a subdiscipline of the social sciences, alongside history, sociology, anthropology, and political science”. The result is a work of vast historical scope, grounded in exhaustive fact-based research, and suffused with literary references. It is both normative and political. Piketty rejects theorising ungrounded in data. He also insists that social scientists “must make choices and take stands in regard to specific institutions and policies, whether it be the social state, the tax system, or the public debt”.
《資本在21世紀(jì)》包括了四個(gè)令人矚目的成就。首先，它把我們帶回到了政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)奠基人的那種深度和廣度。在皮凱蒂本人看來(lái)，“作為社會(huì)科學(xué)的一個(gè)分支”，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是“同歷史學(xué)、社會(huì)學(xué)、人類學(xué)和政治學(xué)并稱的一門科學(xué)”。由此使得這部作品既具有廣闊的歷史視角，又有詳盡的基于事實(shí)的研究，其間還不時(shí)可見(jiàn)對(duì)文學(xué)作品的引用。它既規(guī)范又具有政治意義。皮凱蒂拒絕把沒(méi)有根據(jù)的數(shù)據(jù)理論化。他堅(jiān)稱，社會(huì)科學(xué)家“必須在有關(guān)特定的制度和政策方面——不管其社會(huì)狀態(tài)、稅收體系或是公共債務(wù)如何，做出選擇和站定立場(chǎng)?！?br>
Second, the book is built on a 15-year programme of empirical research conducted in conjunction with other scholars. Its result is a transformation of what we know about the evolution of income and wealth (which he calls capital) over the past three centuries in leading high-income countries. That makes it an enthralling economic, social and political history.
第二，該書(shū)是以一項(xiàng)長(zhǎng)達(dá)15年的與其他學(xué)者共同進(jìn)行的實(shí)證性研究為基礎(chǔ)的，其結(jié)果就是把我們對(duì)有關(guān)收入與財(cái)富（皮凱蒂稱之為資本）在過(guò)去三個(gè)世紀(jì)中在主要的高收入國(guó)家中的演化過(guò)程，轉(zhuǎn)化成了一段引人入勝的歷史，并從經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)和政治等各個(gè)角度對(duì)其做出了解讀。
Among the lessons is that there is no general tendency towards greater economic equality. Another is that the relatively high degree of equality seen after the second world war was partly a result of deliberate policy, especially progressive taxation, but even more a result of the destruction of inherited wealth, particularly within Europe, between 1914 and 1945. A further lesson is that we are slowly recreating the “patrimonial capitalism” – the world dominated by inherited wealth – of the late 19th century.
該書(shū)提出了以下三條經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)：一，向著更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)平等的普遍趨勢(shì)是不存在的；二，見(jiàn)諸于二戰(zhàn)后的那種相對(duì)高度的平等，部分是審慎政策——尤其是累進(jìn)稅——的結(jié)果，然而更主要的還是發(fā)生在1914年至1945年間的、以歐洲為代表的、對(duì)于世襲財(cái)富的毀滅的結(jié)果；由此所引出第三條教訓(xùn)就是，我們正在緩慢地重建19世紀(jì)晚期的那種世界被世襲財(cái)富所主導(dǎo)的“世襲資本主義”。
Some argue that rising human capital will reduce the economic significance of other forms of wealth. But, notes Piketty, “?‘nonhuman capital’ seems almost as indispensable in the twenty-first century as it was in the eighteenth or nineteenth”. Others argue that “class warfare” will give way to “generational warfare”. But inequality within generations remains vastly greater than among them. Yet others suggest that intragenerational mobility robs rising inequality of earnings of significance, particularly in the US. This, too, is false: the rise in inequality of earnings in the US over recent decades is the same however long the period over which earnings are traced. High-school dropouts rarely become chairman of GE.
有人認(rèn)為，日益增長(zhǎng)的人力資本會(huì)降低其他形式的財(cái)富的經(jīng)濟(jì)重要性。但是，皮凱蒂不這么看。他指出：“‘非人力資本’在21世紀(jì)的不可或缺性，看上去幾乎同其在18世紀(jì)和19世紀(jì)那樣”。有人認(rèn)為，“社會(huì)階層間的斗爭(zhēng)”將會(huì)讓位于“代與代之間的斗爭(zhēng)”。但是，幾代人之內(nèi)的不平等仍會(huì)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于一代人之間的不平等。然而，有人以美國(guó)為例指出，代際間的流動(dòng)能消弱日益嚴(yán)重的收入不平等的重要性。但是，這種觀點(diǎn)也是錯(cuò)誤的：在美國(guó)，不管追溯多長(zhǎng)時(shí)間，在最近幾十年間所發(fā)生的收入不平等的加劇都是同之前一樣的。高中輟學(xué)者是幾乎不可能成為通用電氣公司的董事長(zhǎng)的。
An important finding is that the ratio of wealth to income in Europe has climbed back above US levels, notably in France and the UK. Another is the notably big recent rise in the income shares of the top 1 per cent in English-speaking countries (above all, the US) since 1980. Perhaps the most extraordinary statistic is that “the richest 1 percent appropriated 60 percent of the increase in US national income between 1977 and 2007.” Technology and globalisation can hardly explain this, since both were at work in all high-income countries. In all, the two most striking conclusions are the rise of the “supermanager” in the US and the return of patrimonial capitalism in Europe.
該書(shū)有兩個(gè)重要的發(fā)現(xiàn)。一是以英國(guó)和法國(guó)的這些歐洲國(guó)家為代表的，財(cái)富/收入之比已經(jīng)回升到高于美國(guó)的水平了。二是，在以美國(guó)為代表的英語(yǔ)國(guó)家中，自1980年以來(lái)，占[總?cè)丝赸1%的頂層的收入份額出現(xiàn)了大幅的提高。其中最為突出的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)是，“在美國(guó)，最富有的1%已把國(guó)民收入在1977年至2007年間所實(shí)現(xiàn)的增長(zhǎng)的60%據(jù)為己有?！边@不是能用技術(shù)和全球化來(lái)解釋的，因?yàn)榧夹g(shù)和全球化對(duì)所有的高收入國(guó)家都有影響?？傊?，最令人震驚的兩個(gè)結(jié)論是：“超級(jí)管理人”在美國(guó)的崛起和世襲資本主義在歐洲的卷土重來(lái)。
Third, Piketty uses simple economic models to explain what is going on. He notes, for example, that the huge rise in labour earnings at the top of US income distribution is overwhelmingly explained not by sports stars or entertainers but by increases in remuneration of managers. He argues that this is the result of the falls in marginal taxation, which have increased the incentive to bargain for higher pay, reinforced by changes in social norms. The alternative view – that the marginal productivity of top managers has exploded – is, he asserts, unpersuasive, partly because the marginal product of a manager is unmeasurable and partly because overall economic performance has not improved since the 1960s.
第三，皮凱蒂在解釋當(dāng)前的情況時(shí)，使用的是簡(jiǎn)單的經(jīng)濟(jì)模型。比如說(shuō)，他指出，位據(jù)美國(guó)收入分配頂端的勞動(dòng)力所得之巨大增長(zhǎng)是不能用體育或娛樂(lè)明星的收入的巨大增長(zhǎng)來(lái)解釋的，而是應(yīng)該用管理層薪水的巨大增長(zhǎng)來(lái)解釋。他說(shuō)，這是邊際稅稅率降低的結(jié)果，而邊際稅稅率的降低又使管理層為獲取更高的薪水而討價(jià)還價(jià)增添了動(dòng)力，并且使這種社會(huì)規(guī)范的變化得到了強(qiáng)化。皮凱蒂所堅(jiān)持的另一種觀點(diǎn)——頂層管理人的邊際生產(chǎn)力一直在呈現(xiàn)爆發(fā)式的增長(zhǎng)——也是沒(méi)有說(shuō)服力的，其原因一部分在于管理人員的邊際生產(chǎn)力是無(wú)法衡量的，另一部分是因?yàn)樽陨鲜兰o(jì)60年代以來(lái)，經(jīng)濟(jì)的總體表現(xiàn)一直沒(méi)有改善。
More interesting is Piketty's theory of capitalist accumulation. He argues that the ratio of capital to income will rise without limit so long as the rate of return is significantly higher than the economy's rate of growth. This, he holds, has normally been the case. The only exceptions from the past few centuries are when a sizeable part of the return on wealth is expropriated or destroyed, or when an economy has opportunities for exceptionally fast growth, as in postwar Europe or the emerging economies today.
更令人感興趣的是皮凱蒂有關(guān)資本主義積累的理論。他指出，只要資本的收益率顯著地高于經(jīng)濟(jì)體的增長(zhǎng)率，收入/資本之比的增長(zhǎng)就會(huì)沒(méi)有界限。他堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，這種情況已經(jīng)常態(tài)化了。過(guò)去幾個(gè)世紀(jì)中的唯一例外發(fā)生在財(cái)富收益的大部分被沒(méi)收或是遭到毀滅之時(shí)，或是經(jīng)濟(jì)體存在著如戰(zhàn)后的歐洲和當(dāng)今的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體那樣的異?？焖僭鲩L(zhǎng)的機(jī)會(huì)之時(shí)。
This theory is built on two pieces of evidence. One is that the rate of return is only modestly affected by the ratio of capital to income. In the language of economists, the “elasticity of substitution” between capital and labour is far greater than one. In the long run, this seems plausible. Indeed, an age of robotics might further raise the elasticity.
構(gòu)成這一理論基礎(chǔ)的是兩項(xiàng)證據(jù)。其一，收益率僅受到收入/資本之比溫和的影響。用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的話來(lái)說(shuō)，就是資本和勞動(dòng)力之間的“替代彈性”遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于1。從長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看，這似乎還說(shuō)得過(guò)去。實(shí)際上，機(jī)器人時(shí)代可能會(huì)進(jìn)一步提高這種彈性。
The other is that, at least in normal times, capitalists save a sufficiently large share of their returns to ensure that their capital will grow at least as fast as the economy. This is especially likely to be true of the seriously wealthy, who are also likely to enjoy the highest returns. Small fortunes are eaten; big ones are not. The tendency for capital to grow faster than the economy is also more likely when the growth of the economy is relatively slow, either because of demographics or because technical progress is weak. Capital-dominated societies also have low-growth economies.
其二，資本家至少會(huì)在正常的年份中把他們收益的很大一部分儲(chǔ)存起來(lái)，以確保他們的資本起碼能同經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)保持一致。這種情況最有可能發(fā)生在同樣喜歡享受最收益的真正的富人身上。被吃掉的財(cái)富只占一小部分；沒(méi)被吃掉的財(cái)富則占大部分。資本增長(zhǎng)快于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的趨勢(shì)同樣有可能發(fā)生在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)因人口因素或是技術(shù)進(jìn)步微弱而相對(duì)放緩之時(shí)。被資本主宰的社會(huì)也有低增長(zhǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。
Fourth, Piketty makes bold and obviously “unrealistic” policy recommendations. In particular, he calls for a return to far higher marginal tax rates on top incomes and a progressive global wealth tax. The case for the latter is that the reported incomes of the richest are far smaller than their true economic incomes (the amount they can consume without reducing their wealth). The rich may even take themselves outside any fiscal jurisdiction, so enjoying the fiscal position of aristocrats of pre-revolutionary France. This fact blunts one of the criticisms of the book's reliance on pre-tax data: over time, the ability of individual countries to redistribute resources towards the middle and bottom of national income distributions might dwindle away to nothing.
第四，皮凱蒂提出的政策建議雖然大膽但明顯的“不切實(shí)際”，尤其是他呼吁的向?qū)攲拥氖杖胝魇者h(yuǎn)高于現(xiàn)在的邊際稅和在全球范圍內(nèi)對(duì)財(cái)富征稅的政策建議更是如此。至于為何要在全球范圍內(nèi)對(duì)財(cái)富征稅，他提出的理由是：最富有之人的申報(bào)收入遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)少于他們真正的經(jīng)濟(jì)收入（指的是他們可以用于消費(fèi)卻不會(huì)減少他們財(cái)富那部分收入）。富人甚至還有可能將自己置于任何財(cái)政管轄之外，因而他們正在享受著法國(guó)大革命前夕的貴族曾經(jīng)享受的財(cái)政地位。這一事實(shí)讓批評(píng)該書(shū)過(guò)于依賴前稅收時(shí)代的數(shù)據(jù)的一種論調(diào)變得啞口無(wú)言。這種論調(diào)認(rèn)為，個(gè)別國(guó)家向處于國(guó)民收入分配的中間階層和最低層再次分配資源的能力，有可能會(huì)隨著時(shí)間的推移漸漸減弱，以致完全喪失。
Yet the book also has clear weaknesses. The most important is that it does not deal with why soaring inequality – while more than adequately demonstrated – matters. Essentially, Piketty simply assumes that it does.
然而，該書(shū)也存在著一些明顯的弱點(diǎn)。最重要的是，在給與更多的適當(dāng)?shù)恼f(shuō)明的同時(shí)，它沒(méi)有涉及“為什么說(shuō)日益嚴(yán)重的不平等那么重要”這個(gè)問(wèn)題。皮凱蒂只是簡(jiǎn)單地假設(shè)這個(gè)問(wèn)題是重要的。
One argument for inequality is that it is a spur to (or product of) innovation. The contrary evidence is clear: contemporary inequality and, above all, inherited wealth are unnecessary for this purpose. Another argument is that the product of just processes must be just. Yet even if the processes driving inequality were themselves just (which is doubtful), this is not the only principle of distributive justice. Another – to me more plausible – argument against Piketty's is that inequality is less important in an economy that is now 20 times as productive as those of two centuries ago: even the poor enjoy goods and services unavailable to the richest a few decades ago.
支持不平等的一種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，不平等是創(chuàng)新之源（或是之物）。相反的證據(jù)是明顯的：當(dāng)代的不平等和繼承而來(lái)的財(cái)富對(duì)于這種目的來(lái)說(shuō)是不必要的。另一種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，公平過(guò)程的產(chǎn)物必須是公平的。然而，即便是導(dǎo)致不平等的過(guò)程自身是公平的（這還有待商榷 ），這也不是分配公平的唯一原則。另一種反對(duì)皮凱蒂的觀點(diǎn)——我認(rèn)為這種觀點(diǎn)比較合理——認(rèn)為，在一個(gè)生產(chǎn)力水平已高出兩個(gè)世紀(jì)之前20倍的經(jīng)濟(jì)體中，不平等的重要性已經(jīng)降低了：甚至就連窮人也能享受最富有之人在幾十年前都無(wú)法獲得的商品和服務(wù)。
For me the most convincing argument against the ongoing rise in economic inequality is that it is incompatible with true equality as citizens. If, as the ancient Athenians believed, participation in public life is a fundamental aspect of human self-realisation, huge inequalities cannot but destroy it. In a society dominated by wealth, money will buy power. Inequality cannot be eliminated. It is inevitable and to a degree even desirable. But, as the Greeks argued, there needs to be moderation in all things. We are not seeing moderate rises in inequality. We should take notice.
在我看來(lái)，最具說(shuō)服力的反對(duì)正在變得日益嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等的論點(diǎn)是：經(jīng)濟(jì)不平等是同作為公民應(yīng)該享受的真正的平等相矛盾的。如果像古雅典人所相信的那樣，參與公共生活是人類自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的一個(gè)基本方面，巨大的不平等是根本無(wú)法摧毀它的。但是，在一個(gè)由財(cái)富主宰的社會(huì)中，金錢能夠買到權(quán)力。因而，不平等是無(wú)法被消除的。它是不可避免的，甚至從某種程度上來(lái)說(shuō)，是想要得到的。但是，正如希臘人所指出的那樣，對(duì)于“適度”的需要存在于所有事情當(dāng)中。我們沒(méi)有在不平等加劇這個(gè)問(wèn)題上看到這種適度，這才是應(yīng)該注意的。
Martin Wolf is the FT’s chief economics commentator
